JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This debate underlies continuing attempts, at both state and federal levels, to ease further the burden of registration. President Carter's unsuccessful 1977 proposal for election-day registration was the latest example. In 1976 a bill to establish a scheme for nationwide postcard registration was justified by its congressional sponsors as a remedy for the "obstacle course" produced by existing state laws.4 Scholars are interested not only in the accuracy of this claim, but in the more fundamental questions raised by the debate. Discerning variations in the impediments to voting posed by alternate registration provisions helps us understand the saliency to individuals of political participation. If apparently trivial differences in the prerequisites to casting a ballot have substantial effects on the probability of voting, what does this tell us about the relative costs and perceived benefits of going to the polls? How do individuals differ in the extent to which registration requirements impede their access to the ballot box? In attempting to answer these questions, we will be concerned not only with the extent to which registration provisions affect turnout, but also with the political consequences of relaxing the registration laws to make voting everywhere as easy as in the most permissive states. The last section of this article compares the actual presidential electorate in 1972 to the larger, hypothetical electorate that would be produced by easier registration.
In estimating the impact of registration laws, one is identifying the degree to which statewide legal provisions influence individuals. Previous researchers did not dispute the desirability of using individual-level data to study the problem. They used aggregate voting and demographic data because the existing academic surveys, with samples ranging from 1500 to 2300 respondents selected from fewer than 40 states, were an inadequate data base. In this study our data come from the Current Population Survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census in November 1972.5 The sample is nearly 40 times larger than that used by the University of Michigan Center for Political Studies and includes respondents from all 50 states. We will describe our data sources in detail, after a discussion of recent changes in American suffrage laws.
State Suffrage Laws, 1960-73
Each state determines its own registration laws, subject only to certain limitations imposed by the U.S. Constitution, court decisions, and national legislation. Despite these limitations (many of which are quite recent), the states differ widely in the extent to which registration significantly increases the time and energy costs of voting. In some states registration is relatively easy; some have abolished this prerequisite altogether. In other states registration is relatively onerous.
Our examination of state laws begins in 1960 because that year's election provided the data for the two principal studies of the effect of these laws on voter turnout (see note 1). For our purposes, 11 different areas of legal regulation are identified.
1. Poll taxes. In 1960 some southern states imposed a tax as a condition for registration. A few states made the tax liability cumulative, i.e., before being allowed to register, one had to pay not only the current year's tax, but the tax for all earlier and unpaid years of his eligibility. The Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited poll taxes in federal elections in 1964. Two years later the Supreme Court abolished the practice altogether.6 2. Literacy tests. Most common in the South, these ranged from requiring simple literacy to a demand that the applicant interpret a provision of the state or federal constitution. Through inequitable enforcement, 3. Permanent or periodic registration. In 1960 a number of states required potential voters to re-register at intervals of as little as one year. By 1972, this practice was followed in only two states which required re-registration at ten-year intervals. A few states allowed re-registration at the discretion of local officials. This option has been exercised in a couple of southern states, presumably as a means of reducing black turnout.7 4. Purging for nonvoting. Akin to periodic registration is the requirement that people who have not voted within a stated time be dropped from the registration rolls. The period ranges from two to eight years. Some states have no purging provision at all. The first scholars to tackle these problems were Stanley Kelley, Jr., and his associates.12 Acknowledging that registration is an inescapable prerequisite to voting, they set out to explain variations in registration among 104 cities in 1960. By means of multiple regression they estimated the differences in registration related to demographic characteristics and to registration laws, all measured on a city-wide basis.1 3 They concluded that "local differences in the turnout for elections are to a large extent related to local differences in rates of registration, and these in turn reflect to a considerable degree local differences in the rules governing, and arrangements for handling, the registering of voters. ' are much more similar with respect to demographic than legal variables. The latter often are dichotomous, whereas aggregate demographic differences-represent points along a continuum that rarely are very far apart. Since there is not very much state-to-state variation in demographic variables, they cannot explain much of the variance in turnout. This is not the case with legal variables, which do vary dramatically from state to state. As a result, this approach exaggerates the importance of the laws. 16 We do not consider "explaining variance" as interesting as establishing the extent to which particular provisions increase or decrease turnout. This would be a more satisfactory estimate of the effect that the laws have on turnout. It would also allow one to forecast the consequences of proposed changes in the laws. Moreover, previous studies did not consider possible interaction effects between particular provisions and specific groups in the population. They assumed that whatever the effect of a provision, it fell equally on everybody. We tried to obtain the information by sending a one-page questionnaire to each state's chief election official. They were quick to respond to our inquiry; 41 of them replied within a few weeks, although not always with 24Information on sampling error in the Census survey and the procedures for adjusting the standard error of estimates for groups of states below the regional level can be found in "Documentation of the Annual Demographic File," Appendix A, pp. Our coding scheme for the state laws is described in Appendix B. Here we discuss some of the ways we reconciled the complexities of real life to the more simplistic world of quantitative analysis. One set of problems along these lines pertains to states that mandated different procedures for different areas, usually on the basis of population. For example, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin exempted their less populous counties from registration requirements. Since in each case only a small fraction of the state population was excluded and we could not identify our respondents' counties, we ignored this deviation from the laws governing most of the states' residents.
A second set of problems was encountered with the differences between state laws that required a particular practice, or allowed it, or forbade it. We have no way of knowing the extent to which permissive state legislation actually is exploited at the local level. For example, many states authorize the appointment of deputy registrars. This is not the same thing as requiring the deputizing of a set number of registrars to go from door to door or sit at tables in shopping centers and student unions. Lacking knowledge of the extent to which registrars are appointed (not to mention the vigor with which they do their work), we could only distinguish between states that permit deputy registrars and those that do not. On the question of regular hours for registration offices, we classified as "irregular" all states that prescribed any schedule less than regular business hours five days a week. We combined states that required such schedules and those that did not legislate on the issue when our preliminary analysis showed no differences in turnout. States that required evening and/or Saturday office hours were separated from those that did not. (A token Saturday or two was not enough.)
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In short, a great deal is often left up to local officials and the initiative of local interest groups and parties.27 In view of these large areas of discretion, we acknowledge that our data do not necessarily describe the reality of administration and enforcement at the local level.28 They do describe state-level enactments, which still vary considerably, as Table 1 shows. (Other specific coding decisions are described in the footnotes to Table 1.)
Estimating the Impact of Registration Laws on Turnout
Two general propositions about the effect of registration requirements on turnout are suggested by the literature on the personal costs of voting: (1) The more time and energy required to vote, the lower the probability that an individual will vote.29 (2) The costs of voting affect some people more than others; registration laws have their greatest impact on people with less education. 30 We think that there are two explanations for the second proposition. First, more than any other personal characteristic, education increases political interest. More exposure to school produces more information about public issues and greater capacity to understand them. Therefore, better-educated people are more likely to be interested enough to overcome the inconveniences of limited office hours and earlier deadlines. Second, the bureaucratic skills acquired in school reduce the difficulty of overcoming these hurdles. In other words, the likelihood that an individual will vote is not merely a behavioral manifestation of certain individual interests. It also reflects the ease with which these individual predilections can be expressed in action. More education produces 271n Arizona, for example, a recent county registrar of voters required prospective deputy registrars to take a rigorously graded examination. His successor brought about a substantial increase in the number of registrars by relaxing these standards. ( were selected.) Seven states with unusual combinations of registration provisions were oversampled to increase further the variation in the independent variables. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, and Utah were oversampled by 50 percent; and all 202 respondents from North Dakota were included. The resulting subsample of 7,936 actual respondents was used in all subsequent analyses. In no way did we bias our estimates of the effects of the registration laws by using this subsample instead of the full sample. The only statistical "cost" is a slight increase in the standard error for each estimate.34
The demographic variables in our equation were education, age, and region. We also included squared terms for education and age to provide a better fit of the nonlinear relationship between these variables and turnout. When these variables are controlled, race does not have an independent effect on turnout.
Four registration provisions had a consequential impact on the probability of voting and were therefore included in the final equation (Equation II) 350ur initial analysis also included these variables: (a) the number of days before the election an absentee ballot had to be obtained; (b) whether the absentee ballot had to be notarized; and (c) whether voting machines were used. These variables had less than a one percent impact on the probability of voting and their coefficients were not statistically significant. We deleted them after this early stage of the analysis.
In addition, estimates were made for nonlinear functions of the residency requirement and closing date. This did not appreciably improve the fit. We also estimated interaction terms between each provision and education, between deputy registrars and county The effect of the registration provisions on the probability of individuals voting is summarized in Table 3 . The provision with the largest impact is the closing date. Depending on one's probability of otherwise voting, a 30-day closing date decreased the likelihood of voting by 3 to 9 percentage points.36 A 50-day closing date (in effect in Arizona and Georgia) lowered the probability of voting by about 17 percent for those with a 40 to 60 percent chance of going to the polls.
Variations in some other provisions also affected turnout. Irregular registration office hours (less than 40 hours a week) lowered by 2 to 4 percentage points the probability that a person would vote. Offices closed on Saturdays and in the evening decreased by 2 to 6 percent the probability of voting. In states that did not allow any form of absentee registration the chances of voting were 2 to 4 percent lower.
Two contextual variables other than the registration laws had an independent effect on turnout. Longer voting hours increased turnout a bit. Keeping the polls open for 14 hours registration, and between deputy registrars and irregular office hours. All were insignificant.
Finally, we examined the independent effect on turnout of income and party competition. Poorer people, of course, are less likely to vote, and party competition is often said to result in higher turnout. Thus any estimates of the relationship between registration laws and turnout that omitted consideration of these two variables might lead to a spurious conclusion.
We used the following procedure to determine whether these two variables in the error term should be included in the analysis. For one of these variables to bias the coefficient of a particular registration provision (which we will call X1), two conditions had to be met: After controlling for the other independent demographic variables, the variable in question had to be correlated both with X1 and with turnout. If either of these conditions were not met (i.e., if one of the partial correlations was zero), then the variable could safely be left out of the analysis without biasing the estimated coefficient for variable X Using this procedure, we founA that income was not correlated with any registration provision, once education, region, and age had been controlled. The average magnitude of the partial correlations of the registration provisions was .029. The partial correlation between competition and turnout was -.009. Therefore, excluding these variables from Equation II does not bias the estimated coefficients for the registration laws. The measure of party competition we used was adopted from Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Politics in the American States, 2d ed., ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 87. 36As explained in Appendix C, the estimated effect of an independent variable in probit analysis depends on the probability that the individual would otherwise vote.
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Vol. 72 increased the probability of an individual voting from 1 to 3 percent. A concurrent gubernatorial election raised turnout from 1 to 2 percent. On the other hand, a concurrent senatorial contest had no discernible impact on turnout. This difference between elections for senator and governor reflects the latter office's greater capacity to generate organizational re- sources for get-out-the-vote drives.37 Southerners were somewhat less likely to vote than northerners even when education, age, and the registration laws were controlled. The regional gap varied between 2 and 6 percent. In other words, the continued lower turnout in the South is not fully explained by its demographic characteristics nor by its more restrictive registration laws.
We could find no evidence to suggest that in 1972 this regional gap was due to coercion of blacks in the South. An interaction term for southern blacks was included in the analysis. Interaction terms also were entered for southern blacks with each of the registration provisions. The estimated coefficients for these variables were neither substantively nor statistically significant. Southern blacks were no less likely to vote than one would expect on the basis of their age, education, and region. Voter registration provisions in 1972 did not have an added impact on southern blacks over and above this impact on white southerners with the same age and education. aThe effect on turnout of a registration provision depends on the probability that an individual would otherwise vote. The cell entry is the estimated effect of the provision on an individual with the specified probability of voting. For example, a person who was otherwise 40 percent likely to vote was 8.7 percent less likely to do so if he lived in a state with a 30-day closing date. A person who was 90 percent likely to vote was only 3.3 percent less likely to do so as a result of a 30-day closing date. These estimates were derived by using the cumulative normal distribution to evaluate the probit estimates in Table 2. would be on the level of national turnout if certain changes in the laws were adopted in every state. This cannot be learned directly from the probit estimates alone. For example, if a certain provision had a coefficient of -.10 but affected only 15 percent of the population, changing it would not have as much impact on aggregate turnout as would changing a provision that had a coefficient of -.07 but affected half the population.
Registration Law
To estimate the national electoral consequences of changes in the laws, we reweighted the subsample to be a representative sample of the civilian, citizen, voting-age population, excluding the District of Columbia.38 Using Equation II, for each respondent we predicted what turnout would be if we assumed that certain registration provisions were enacted into law in every state. In each case, the projected provision was the more permissive alternative already used in some states. In other words, for each provision we assumed that every state had adopted the most permissive alternative in force in at least one state in 1972. From this estimate we subtracted the predicted turnout given the provisions as they actually existed in 1972. Summing across respondents yields an estimate of the projected aggregate change in turnout.39 Table 4 presents these projected increases in turnout for the country as a whole and for various demographic groups. The entries in each column represent the projected increase in turnout forthe indicated group if the provision listed at the head of the column were adopted nationwide. The 1972 data do not allow us to estimate directly the increase in turnout that would result from allowing citizens to register at the polls on election day or from abolishing registration altogether. The most liberal reforms 38This reweighting was accomplished by multiplying, for each case, the original weight by the inverse of the sub-sampling proportion for the state from which the case was selected. This yields a reweighted N of 126,591. This number is slighty less than the weighted N mainly because respondents from the District of Columbia were deleted from the probit analysis and secondarily because of the random selection of cases in the sub-sampling procedure.
39For each respondent, Equation II was used to compute a probit estimate which was then converted to a probability by evaluating that number on the cumulative standard normal distribution. (The International Mathematical and Statistical Library includes a fortran subroutine which will compute this value.) The same procedure was followed, altering the values for the variables in Equation II to simulate changes in the registration provisions. For each respondent these two probabilities were subtracted. The arithmetic mean of these individual probabilities is the estimated aggregate percentage. 
Variations in the Effect of Registration Laws
We have already seen that the effect of relaxing registration laws would not be felt evenly across the population. One reason, of course, is that the gap between the status quo and uniformly permissive provisions is much greater in some places than in others. In 1972 few states came close to the hypothetical permissive situation assumed in Table 4 .41 The laws in the southern states would undergo the biggest change. Therefore making registration easier would have the greatest impact in that part of the country. If all four provisions described in Table 4 were enacted, turnout in the South would increase by approximately 12.8 percentage points while turnout in the North would go up by about 7.8 percent. This difference between the regions is caused by two factors. First, as observed in Table 1 , the southern states presently have more restrictive statutes than the rest of the country. Therefore easing the laws would cause greater changes in the South. Second, since those with fewer years of formal education would benefit most from the changes and since the South has a lower mean level of education than the northern states, a greater percentage of southerners would benefit from the changes.
Within the South, the projected increases in turnout for blacks and whites are relatively similar. Whites would vote 12.4 percent more, while black turnout in the South would go up by 14.5 percentage points. In the North, where the gap between the races in educational attainment is smaller, there is less racial difference in projected turnout. An additional 7.7 percent of northern whites would go to the 41North Dakota did not require registration at all in 1972. There were not enough respondents from this single, sparsely populated state to permit precise estimates of the effects of its unique voting laws. By 1976 four other states permitted election day registration.
polls, compared to a gain in turnout of 9.1 percent for the blacks.
The most striking variations in the effects of registration reform would be among people at different levels of education.42 Liberalizing registration provisions would have by far the greatest impact on the least educated, and relatively little effect on well-educated people. Turnout would increase 10.2 percent among people with less than five years of school, by 10.4 percent among elementary school graduates, 9.3 percent among those with a high school diploma, and only 2.8 percent among people with some postgraduate schooling.
Seeing how the costs of voting affect some people more than others aids our understanding of variations in the importance of politics to individual citizens. Before examining this subject, we can dispose of an alternative explanation for the greater impact of restrictive registration laws on the uneducated: that education is in large measure a surrogate for income and occupation. Better-off people, so the argument might go, have more free time for nonessentials like registering and voting, while the harried low-income worker cannot afford long journeys during business hours. But the impact of the laws diminishes with every increment in education. High school graduates and college dropouts are no more able to take time off from work than the less-educated citizens whose behavior is most affected by the laws. A couple of years of college do not admit one to the leisure class. Moreover, data on time use show that blue-collar workers have slightly more free time than executives, professionals, and other white-collar people.43
It is useful to ponder the costs and benefits of voting, and how they are distributed in the population. The appeal of participating in an election increases with education, and the costs of doing so vary inversely with education. It is 42Table 4 also shows the effect of liberalized registration laws by income and age. Poorer people would be most affected, as we would expect because of the relationship between education and income. The variation among income categories is much smaller than among people with different educational attainment, however. This reflects the much stronger relationship between education and turnout. Variations by age are small. People in the age groups with the highest turnout would be affected only slightly less than those with the lowest voting rates-citizens under 32 and over 78. little wonder, then, that apparently trivial increments in the burden of registering may raise the cost of voting above the threshold of many people. We see that threshold established by two factors: the individual's level of interest in the election, and his ability to manage the procedural steps required to cast a ballot.
Formal education increases one's capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract, and intangible subjects (that is, subjects like politics). Acquisition of these skills and facts heightens interest in politics. Schooling also imparts experience with bureaucratic relationships and such simple information-seeking skills as looking up a necessary item in a book. Irrespective of one's degree of political interest, this heightened level of understanding and information would also reduce the costs of registering, even in the most restrictive state. In short, education is likely to increase interest in politics and reduce the costs of manifesting that interest by voting.
The more permissive the registration laws, the lower the time, energy, and information costs of voting. This is of greatest benefit to people whose interest is not sufficient to carry them across the higher threshold imposed by more restrictive provisions. The costs imposed by restrictive laws might be trifling to an educated person, and increasingly daunting to those with little schooling.
Thus for someone who is interested in politics, can anticipate the need for registration before the peak excitement of election eve, and can easily locate the registrar's office, registration is a relatively costless act. On the other hand, for someone whose interest is aroused only a few days before the election, has minimal exposure to information, and is less adept at learning things like places and hours of registration, the whole process is a much more difficult hurdle. The barriers imposed by restrictive laws seem to make little difference to the well-educated, but are a fairly formidable impediment to people with less interest and bureaucratic skill. To put it another way, the difference in turnout produced by variations in registration laws is an indication of the varying commitment and capacity to vote of different kinds of people.
The Political Consequences of Registration Law Reform
Liberalizing the registration laws would expand the electorate and would increase disproportionately the turnout of low-income groups. Because of this differential impact, most schol- How should we assess the significance of our findings about the effect of laws on turnout? Is a nine percent increase in voter turnout disappointingly small, or gratifyingly substantial? Measured against the rhetoric of some champions of voter registration reform, nine percent is fairly small potatoes. But political rhetoric is seldom a good yardstick for policy analysis.
The changes we have considered are within a narrow compass of alternatives. One question that remains is how much national voter turnout would increase if the burden for registration shifted from the individual to the government. What would be the increase in turnout if, as in most democracies, the government took the initiative for registering voters by establishing national voter lists through a door-to-door canvass or by mailing postcards to all citizens? Our data do not allow us to make a precise estimate of the impact of a registration system in which the government bore responsibility for establishing voter eligibility and where virtually all the costs of registering were removed from the individual. Given the results that would be achieved by the relatively minor changes discussed above, we are confident that establishing a European-type registration system would increase voter turnout by substantially more than nine percent.
We should note that the registration laws are not the only environmental variables affecting turnout. The modem peak of voter turnout was reached -in 1960, when one-and two-year residency requirements, poll taxes, and literacy tests were common; and when millions of southern blacks were disenfranchised through maladministration of the laws. Since then all these barriers have been removed, the nation's educational level has risen substantially, and turnout has fallen. The 18-year-old vote does not explain the drop in turnout. Other aspects of the political environment clearly are at work. This caution, however, should not distract us from the finding of this paper that registration laws have a substantial effect on the number of people who go to the polls on election day.
Appendix A Samples for the Study of Turnout
Estimates of turnout in sample surveys are always somewhat higher than those based on the total number of ballots cast by the aggregate voting-age population. Since 1948, reported turnout in sample surveys has ranged between 5 percent and 17 percent higher than the aggregate estimates.a The 1972 election is no exception, as Table A Observers of this persistent gap between survey reports and "the real figure" sometimes jump to the conclusion that the discrepancy reflects only misreporting by respondents reluctant to admit that they did not do their civic duty. This is only one of a number of contributing factors, however. First, it should be understood that the aggregate percentage underestimates turnout. records, suggested that response error was about 8 percent! Clearly, some response error exists in our data, although we cannot say just how much. We feel safe assuming that the response error is uncorrelated with the registration statutes. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, however, we caution readers against assuming that overreporting is the sole cause of the discrepancy between our estimated turnout and the aggregate figure.
The additional discrepancy of 6.1 percent between reported turnout in the Census survey and the Michigan Center for Political Studies survey can be attributed to three factors.9 First, the Census Bureau had a higher interview completion rate. 
